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Public authorities increasingly involve the private sector in financing, building and operating 
new infrastructures. Many reasons are usually given to justify private sector involvement. One of 
them claims that private operators can manage project construction and operation more 
efficiently. Nevertheless, whether a public or a private operator, there is a target IRR, very close 
to the standard notion of Weighted Average Capital Cost (WACC), which is higher in the case of 
the private alternative because it must also include the operator's profit. The fundamental issue is 
the result of two opposite effects: on the one hand, the effect of the higher efficiency of the private 
operator; on the other hand, the effect of a lower WACC for the public operator. This paper 
proposes a model of the determination of the need of public financing which formalizes these 
two effects and allows analysing the conditions under which the PPP would be advantageous for 
the public finances. Simulations estimate the efficiency gain from private operators needed to 
compensate their higher WACC. Results confirmed the so-called ‘paradox of financial 
profitability’: recourse to PPP is more relevant for public funds when the profitability of the 
project is lower. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1990, the World Bank counted, in the countries where it operates, about 60 cases of public-
private partnerships set up to finance, build and operate public facilities. This represented about 
$2 billion, all sectors combined. In the 25 years that followed, the World Bank identified more 
than 7,000 PPP projects in 81 countries representing $2,100 billion in investments (World Bank, 
2016). Simultaneously, in the industrialized countries, PPPs have developed rapidly, or rather 
have revived, considering the major role played by private initiative in the explosion of the 
railway system in the 19th century. The Private Finance Initiative voted in Britain in 1992 was 
major milestone of this renewal. France followed that example twelve years later, with the 2004 
ruling on partnership contracts, allowing the diversification of the long-standing practice of 
concessions. 
This growing implication of private operators in new public facilities has been fostered by two 
main concerns of governments. The first corresponds to an opportunistic budget strategy 
(Maskin & Tirole, 2008) to the extent that the commitments of public authorities are not generally 
part of its debt consolidation for partnership contracts (Marty, 2007). This is favourable to PPPs, 
particularly with a cosmetic goal for the accrual accounting of States: either private debt is 
guaranteed by public finances (de jure or de facto) as a last resort in case of failure of the 
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operator, that is, when the liability of the debt cannot be covered by the commercial receipts of 
the project; or the partnership is solely at the risk of the private sphere, but then the subsidy 
usually necessary for the financial balance of the operation is increased according to the risk 
premiums demanded by the operator and the banks. In the first case, the debt linked to the 
project is not officially externalized through the PPPs; in the second, it is indeed excluded from 
the public debt but at the price of an increase of the public subsidy through the remuneration of 
the operator’s own funds and the compensation of the risk premiums. 
However, in the two previous cases the pressure of overly indebted public finances goes in 
favour of systems favouring private financing and indebting, even if it implies retributions of 
capital and risk premiums likely to burden in the long term the cost of the operations for public 
finances. The PPP’s principal task is to “mask” public debt. We will deliberately ignore these 
opportunistic behaviours in what follows and consider that recourse to PPP is exclusively 
determined by the other main concern of governments. 
That second concern is clearly explained in the aforementioned British and French laws, and is 
particularly present in the World Bank’s pressure in favour of PPPs: it is the perspective of a 
lower subsidy for the public authority, linked to the increase in economic profitability that the 
private operator is liable to bring in comparison with a public operator. One can indeed count on 
the fact that a private operator, used to being cost-effective, is able to ensure the better internal 
rate of return of an operation, either by saving on investment costs, or through shorter 
construction lead times, or by better operating cost control, or by a combination of these efforts to 
maintain profitability. This has been observed in a great number of activities (for instance 
Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001) even if it is not systematically verified for PPPs (Estache & Rossi, 
2002). 
The political objective is to minimize the contribution of public finances in building and 
operating public facilities. We will leave aside the role of “hiding” the debt to consider 
exclusively this objective. The issue is therefore to know if the remuneration of private capital, in 
theory higher than that of public capital, can be compensated by gains in profitability that can be 
ensured by the private operator, so as to minimize public expense. This article proposes to 
formalize and analyse the conditions in which a PPP enables this minimization. 
This was in a wide variety of activities (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001) and the hypothesis can be 
explored even if the literature reported experiences in PPP that were not verified (Shaoul & al., 
2006, Acerete & al., 2009). 
We shall not decide on this debate in this article. We simply hypothesize that to build and 
operate a public facility of a specific quality, the primary objective of the public authorities is to 
minimize the subsidy required. Thus we leave to one side the “hiding place” function of the debt 
to consider this objective only. Since the remuneration of private capital is a priori higher than 
that of public capital, the question is to know under what conditions this additional cost can be offset 
by better efficiency from the private operator. This article proposes to formalize and analyse these 
conditions. 
We will therefore consider projects benefitting from commercial receipts and public subsidies if 
necessary to their financial balance. The concrete examples on which we base our hypothesis 
concern French highway projects that most often require a share of public finance. Although the 
results are illustrated this way by examples from transport economics, it should be borne in mind 
that they may concern any other sector where public financing completes commercial receipts. If 
we consider, for example, the question of how the financing of an opera house must be divided 
between spectators and taxpayers, we are in the same situation as that of the best combination 
between tolls and subsidies to finance a motorway project. 
However, financing, building and operating this type of public facility may involve private 
operators to very different extents. We will not consider this extensive range of possible role 
EJTIR 18(4), 2018, pp.517-534  519 
Bonnafous and Faivre d’Arcier 
Under which conditions is a PPP relevant for public spending? 
 
distributions between the public and private spheres, which correspond to as many PPP 
formulas. The issue of minimizing the subsidy will be reduced to a simplified alternative between 
two options that we will call “public option” and “private option.” 
These two options will be defined in section 2. In each case, we will explain how to determine the 
weighted average cost of capital (or WACC). In section 3, we will describe the mathematical 
relation between a project’s need for subsidies and the level of the WACC, considering the 
parameters that determine the financial profitability of a given project. Section 4 will deal with 
the estimation of the orders of magnitude of these parameters for a set of concrete projects in 
order that the analyses proposed are located within the ranges of values that we may safely call 
realistic. In section 5, we will situate and analyse the conditions in which the efficiency of the 
private operator can compensate a WACC higher than that of the public operator, i.e. that the 
conditions for which a PPP may relieve public expense are united. Section 6 will present few 
results on the issue of a swing in favour of either operator, using our model to do simulation in 
order to evaluate the realism of the orders of magnitude of the necessary gains in efficiency. 
Section 7 will finally show how these results confirm the ‘paradox of financial profitability. 
2. The simplified public-private alternative and the values of the Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital 
Our analysis gives an alternative to two deliberately contrasted solutions. This is the same as 
setting aside, unless indicated otherwise, the intermediate situations in which the roles of the 
public or private actors can be amended. The public and private options that we consider are 
“stylized” as follows: 
 In the “public” option, the operator in charge of the project is a public entity, or a non-
profit private society like Network Rail3 in Great Britain. In both cases, we will call it a 
“public operator.” It is not supposed to make profits, but should cover the investment 
and operating costs, including the financial charges of its loans, through commercial 
receipts. The latter can comprise tolls paid by the users, or a shadow toll4 paid by the 
public authority. In the case of a loss-making project, it is assumed that the deficit is 
compensated by the public authority: a subsidy, determined on the basis of a cost-benefit 
analysis established ex ante, must then complete the expected receipt, so that the operator 
is ensured that the cost is covered. 
 In the “private” option, the mechanism is the same, except that private operators may 
have more expensive loan conditions than a public operator, and they must ensure the 
remuneration of their own capital, and therefore generate a profit. 
Under these conditions, the WACC for a private operator is, by construction, higher than it is for 
a public operator. Obviously, situations vary from country to country, the conditions of financial 
markets, the nature of the project and, of course, the credit rating of the operator whether public 
or private. We shall not focus on this aspect of the question. However, in order to propose 
concrete representations of our theoretical results, we have chosen orders of magnitude observed 
through the authors’ participation in official procedures of presentation and evaluation of 
candidates’ tenders to take over a concession. The orders of magnitude used hereinafter are 
therefore not the result of theoretical calculation. They simply correspond to observed situations. 
                                                        
3 The private society Railtrack was stripped of the network’s management in 2002. It was then transferred to 
Network Rail, a “non-profit agency” under State control. 
4 A shadow toll corresponds to a free toll for the user, but the public authority compensates it by paying the tolls 
itself. The operator is therefore encouraged to satisfy demand as well as possible as soon as the shadow toll is 
higher than the marginal cost of use. 
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According to the rules of the scheme set out above, the public operator is assumed to implement the 
project if the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) expected covers the rate of interest of the market incremented 
by a risk premium taking into account the uncertainties linked to any financial evaluation of a 
project. For example, these are risks on the investment and operating costs, but also commercial 
risks linked to uncertainties on traffic and revenue forecasts. In the economic context chosen for 
our exercise, with long term rates that were 4% on the financial market and a risk premium also 
estimated at 4 %, the WACC was 8% for the public operator. In order to conform to the rules 
imposed on it, the public operator can only start the project if its IRR is at least equal to 8%. Any 
values lower than this, require a subsidy to offset the difference and ensure that this threshold is 
reached.  
In these conditions, the WACC is basically different according to the option. In the following we 
place ourselves in the general framework of determining discount rates belonging to the 
theoretical approach of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). However, we do not deal in 
detail with the Beta Factor of the classical formulation of the required return rate: Ra=Rf+β(Rm-Rf). 
This Beta factor reflects that the asset returns of a particular project are expected to vary with the 
returns of the market, Rf being the Risk-free rate and (Rm-Rf) the return over Rf on the market. 
We know that the empirical values of these parameters are dependent on the financing 
mechanism and on the situation of the considered country and that they can vary a lot, 
particularly in developing countries (Estache and Pinglo, 2004). Nevertheless, we consider in 
what follows the quantity β(Rm-Rf) globally, as the values of β are implicitly the same for the 
sample of projects, all motorway toll projects, used by us. By way of example and to be able to 
propose later on some concrete representations of our theoretical results, we use orders of 
magnitude corresponding to the situation in the first semester of 2012 in a country rated AAA or 
AA+ and for loans with long terms of maturity (20 to 35 years). 
The private operator will be interested in the same project only if they are able to cover the debt 
charge that they must commit to, augmented by a risk premium, like the public operator, but 
they must also ensure the remuneration of their own capital through a profit margin. For 
comparable conditions on the financial market, the profitability required of the project will be 
organized differently from the previous one. 
Firstly, the share of funding for which the private operator raises a long term loan may be more 
expensive than for the public operator since a private company cannot benefit from the same 
credit rating as a public company whose debt is, in the last resort, guaranteed by the State. In the 
case of big European private operators, the rates can be higher by about 50 points compared to a 
public operator, thereby increases the rate on the market to 4.5%. Other elements in the risk 
premium are not taken into account in the banks’ consideration toward the entity that takes out 
the loan, but result from an analysis of the risks particular to the project. By experience, they are 
generally of the same order of magnitude as the public option. In total, for this share of funding 
covered by the loan, the interest rate required to suitably ensure the burden of the loan can rise 
from 8 to 8.5% for a private operator. 
For the share of financing corresponding to the capital contributed by the private operator, the 
return on this commitment (which includes the risk premium) is notably higher. The 
corresponding rate varies distinctly according to the economic situation and the business sector 
considered. It is often about double the cost of the loans contracted. That can mean, for example, 
a profitability ratio of about 16% for that share of funding. 
If we assume that the financing of the investment includes 80% loans and 20% capital, which 
corresponds to current gearing, the combination of a return of 8.5% for the first and 16% for the 
second corresponds to a WACC of 10%. This means that for any value of the project’s IRR lower 
than 10%, a subsidy will be required by the private operator to ensure its financial balance.  
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We note that in a Technical Paper issued by the Government of New South Wales (2007), the 
WACC recommended for a PPP is 9.6%, on the basis of a Risk-free Rate (Rf) of 6% and a β of 0.6 
in the case of a transport project. 
It is noteworthy that this kind of demand from taxpayers is theoretically justified, whether the 
operator is public or private, through external advantages to the financial balance of the project, 
according to a calculation of the socio-economic profitability index. It is no longer the sole point 
of view of the operator and of their bottom line that is considered, but that of the entire 
community. The losses and advantages of all the economic agents are thus evaluated, for 
example, the net losses and receipts of the rival modes or the variations of additional users, or 
even the consequences of the project on safety or the environment. Territorial planning 
considerations can also justify the decision to invest. This counterpart of positive externalities of 
public subsidies can be considered equivalent in both hypotheses since the investment is 
assumed as being subject to the same specifications, whether the operator is public or private. 
This means, in ordinary language, that the public authority “buys” the same thing, no matter the 
status of the operator. It has therefore every interest in choosing the vendor offering the lowest 
“price.” Based on the previous considerations on the profitability rate required according to 
whether the operator is public or private, and by assuming (temporarily) that they have the same 
economic efficiency, three situations are possible: 
 For highly profitable projects (over 10% with the orders of magnitude suggested), no 
public funding is required, whether the operator be public or private. The public 
authority should therefore maintain control of an operation plan which brings a financial 
surplus. 
 For moderately profitable projects (between 8 and 10%), the public operator can invest 
without subsidies, whereas the private operator must require a subsidy that brings the 
project’s financial profitability back up to 10%. The first option must be used. 
 For projects with low profitability (under 8%), a subsidy is required in both cases, but it is 
bigger if the operator is private, since it must in that case raise the financial profitability of 
the project to a higher level. The public operator still remains more interesting. 
Under the assumption of equal efficiency between the public and private sectors, the orders of 
magnitude illustrate the fact that the “private” option is, in all cases, more expensive for the 
public finances than the “public” option. It is therefore clear that recourse to a PPP rests on the 
opposite assumption: it is justified by lower subsidy levels only if the private operator is more 
efficient to the point of compensating a higher WACC than that of the public operator and 
therefore requires a lower level of subsidy. 
For each of the two options, public or private, the same project therefore corresponds to different 
IRRs, but also, as stated above, to IRRs dealt with differently and, finally, to different needs for 
subsidies. Thus it is the relation between the need for subsidy and the IRR which must be examined. It is 
therefore necessary to establish this relation to formalize the stakes of this alternative for public 
finance and then to specify from where this gain in efficiency can be found.  
3. Financial profitability, WACC and need for subsidies 
For this relation, let us consider a project corresponding to a stylized but nonetheless classical 
chronological series of the costs and benefits represented in figure 1. We take into account only 
the commercial elements that enter into the calculation of financial profitability. If the 
commissioning is assumed to occur on date t = 0, the annual investment cost between the dates – 
d and 0 is c. Starting at the commissioning date, the profit generated is assumed to take the form 
(a+b.t). 
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Figure 1. The Cost/Benefit Theoretical Model, or abcd Model 
 
The project’s internal rate of return (IRR), which is the discount rate which cancels its financial 
Net Present Value NPVf is therefore a function of four parameters c, d, a and b. It must be 
compared with a rate of return that an operator (public or private) is entitled to expect. 
We will use the following writing: 
𝛼  is the discount rate used to calculate the NPVf of the project, 
𝛼0  is the IRR of the project, i.e. the discount rate which cancels the NPVf, 
𝛿  is the supplement of IRR that the subsidy brings to the operator, 
 𝜏  is the subsidy rate, i.e. the proportion of c financed by the subsidy. 
For the discount rate α and the updated balance sheet from date –d to T, the net present value is:  
 

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0
0
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dtetbadtecNPV        (1) 
We will assume that the discount is extended to infinity, which is without consequences on the 
results which interest us, because of the small weight of the distant future, and, especially, the 
convergence of the integral function in equation (1) when T → ∞. The equation becomes5:  
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The project’s IRR, α0, is then an implicit solution of the equation:  
  01
0
.0 

 b
aec
d          (3) 
A subsidy rate τ reduces the annual cost of construction c to c.(1- τ) and brings the IRR α0 to 
(α0+δ) so that equation (3) becomes : 
     011
0
0 
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 

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5 The details of the calculation are presented in the initial presentation of this formalization (Bonnafous, 2002). 
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Of which we can deduce the expression of the subsidy rate:  
 
    1
1
0
0
0



 d
ec
ba


          (5)  
The relation between τ, the subsidy rate, and δ, the increase of the project’s IRR expected by the 
operator, depends on the parameters c, d, a, b and, of course, α0. These parameters are 
additionally linked with each other by equation (4) that defines the IRR α0 of the project (or what 
is equivalent, τ = 0 if and only if δ = 0). This implies some difficulties in the study and the 
representation of these functions that we will be able to overcome with cross curves. 
Nevertheless, these cross curves must be represented with the variation of pertinent parameters, 
which correspond to values that have actually been observed. The estimation of these parameters 
will be presented in section 4, although it is useful to emphasize a major consequence of the 
properties of function (5) which corresponds to what we previously termed the paradox6 of 
financial profitability (Bonnafous, 1999 & 2002).  
By implementing the two equations (3) and (5), the dependence of the subsidy rate can be 
established in relation to the values of parameters a, b, c and d (and thus α0) and in relation to δ. If 
we wish to represent this dependence, it is necessary to freeze these five parameters and only 
vary those whose role we want to highlight. This requires using the classical method of abacuses. 
Only one of these abacuses is shown here (figure 2), as it is sufficient to illustrate our argument. 
The annual cost of construction c is fixed at a normed value of 25, and the duration d of this 
construction is fixed at 4 years. We consider pairs of values of a, the net profit of the project on 
the date of commissioning, and of b, the annual increase of the net revenue. Each pair of values a 
and b obviously corresponds to a value of α0, the intrinsic IRR of the project, and to three 
functions of the subsidy rate, the functions of (α0+ δ). Three cases can be distinguished according 
to values of a and b estimated in the empirical part of our exercise which will be presented in 
section 4. 
 A case of low profitability with an intrinsic IRR of 2% corresponding to minimum values 
of a and b in the empirical part of our exercise, i.e. 2.0 and 0.0, respectively. 
 A case of high profitability with an intrinsic IRR of 8% corresponding to maximum values 
of a and b, i.e. 6.0 and 0.3, respectively. 
 A median case with an intrinsic IRR of 5% corresponding to values of a and b, i.e. 0.3 and 
0.11, respectively. 
What we call the profitability rate paradox can therefore be seen clearly in figure 2 and can be 
summed up by the fact that the chances of recourse to a PPP being successful will be as great for 
the public authorities as the intrinsic IRR α0 is low. Indeed, let us assume that the public and 
private operators are equivalent in terms of performance and they generate the same intrinsic 
IRR α0 for the same project. 
                                                        
6 This should not be confused with the Public Private Partnership Paradox which concerns the interest for the 
public authorities in not externalizing certain risks (Gray S. and al., 2010). 
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Figure 2. Intrinsic IRR, subsidy rate and targeted IRR 
 
With the values of WACC that we have chosen for the public option (8%) and for the private 
option (10%), the value of α0, the highest (8%), corresponds to a zero subsidy in the public option 
but to one of 27% of the construction costs with a private partnership. In the median case, with α0 
having a value of 5%, the public operator requires a subsidy close to 50% and the changeover 
from public to private requires raising this subsidy by 13%. In the case where α0 is only 2%, the 
private operator requires a subsidy of 79% of the costs which is increased by 5% in the case of 
continued recourse to a private operator. 
Whence this formulation of the paradox: for an equivalent efficiency of operators, the lower the 
profitability of the project, the lower the cost of the changeover from a public to a private 
operator will be. This result is obviously the consequence of the mathematical properties of the 
function expressed in equation (5); more precisely, of the concavity of this function and the fact 
that its derivative as a function of δ is as high as α0 is low. 
The central question of this article is to determine whether the gains in efficiency that the private 
operator must ensure to offset a higher WACC will be as achievable as the intrinsic profitability 
of the project will be low (and thus a higher subsidy requirement). This question can only be 
answered on the basis of the values of variables observed empirically. 
4. Estimations of the orders of magnitude of the parameters 
To represent these pertinent ranges of variation7, available financial evaluations relating to 
concrete projects must be used. The previous profitability calculation having been reduced to a 
simplified representation along four parameters, it is enough to seek estimators. These estimators 
of a, b, c and d will be calculated on the basis of 17 evaluations of French motorway projects (or 
variations of projects) that we have decided to analyse for two good reasons. Firstly, these 
evaluations are available in an official report8 concerning these projects. Secondly, and most 
importantly, it is one of the rare databases evaluating major motorway projects in which the 
                                                        
7 The following calculation was initially presented by Bonnafous & Faivre d’Arcier (2013). 
8 This report drafted by two French administrations (Conseil Général des Ponts et Chaussées & Inspection des 
Finances, 2003) is already fairly old but provides the assessments with homogeneous and audited methods. 
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results have been harmonized for the needs of this report, and for which the financial 
profitability and the needs for subsidies have been calculated with identical methods. 
These methods are evidently classical and come under the cost-benefit analysis. They do not rely 
on the model developed in the previous section, but on a detailed calculation of the records of 
costs and benefits. To work with our own model, the numerical values of the corresponding 
parameters a, b, c and d must therefore be deduced from the evaluations available. 
To this end, it is assumed that the linearity of the chronological series of costs and benefits 
represented in figure 1 is a good approximation resulting from the projects’ evaluations. This 
assumption is all the more reasonable as, in these evaluations, traffic is assumed to increase 
linearly and the tolls are assumed steady in actual price. We will also assume that the infinite 
discounting of profits provides an acceptable approximation of the discounting over 50 years. 
To simplify the analysis, let us separate from equation (2) the discounted cost C* of the works 
that is deduced from equation (1) and written as: 
 1.*  de
c
C 

          (7) 
This amounts to temporarily free ourselves from the variation of parameters c and d, whereas 
they could of course differ if the operator is public or private. We will choose to “mask” for the 
moment these two parameters in C*. In that case, equation (2) becomes:  
2
*

ba
CNPV
f
          (8) 
The project’s IRR, α0, is then a solution of equation (3) which becomes:  
0
2
00
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
ba
C           (9) 
If the operator, whether private or public, requires a higher IRR, that is (α0 + δ), it can be ensured 
by a subsidy S which verifies the equation: 
2
00
*
)(  



ba
CS         (10) 
Equations (9) and (10) are therefore two linear equations with two unknowns, a and b, when, for 
each of the 17 equations available, we know: 
 The discounted cost of the project C* 
 The IRR of the project α0, 
 The estimation of the subsidy S, calculated for a target IRR (α0 + δ), in this case 10% for 
the report. 
The numerical values obtained for the estimates of a and b for each of the 17 motorway projects 
used are presented in appendix A. For our exercise, we will only present the mean values and the 
value ranges that merit exploration. 
5. Pertinent value ranges of the parameters 
For each of the 17 projects, we estimated the parameters using equations (9) and (10); C* being 
fixed at 100 by convention for each evaluation. The mean values of the estimates are 3.3 and 0.11 
for a and b respectively. The values obtained for the 17 projects are represented in figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3. Relation between a and b – 17 French motorway projects (C* = 100 – d = 4) 
 
It should be noted that the issue here is not crucial anymore when α0>8 %. We can deduce easily 
from equation (9) that it corresponds to the inequality b>-0.08a +0.64 represented in the figure 
above. We observe that only one out of the 17 projects is in that case, and, therefore, that all the 
others require subsidies. 
In the following calculations, we will explore the situations corresponding to the plausible orders 
of magnitude by varying the parameters between their boundaries. To define the boundaries of a 
and b, we can simply use the values close to their maximum and minimum values, i.e. 2 and 6 for 
a, and 0 and 0.3 for b. In addition, Figure 3 above suggests that we can also vary the two 
parameters together, which will be proposed later on. 
Of course, the private operator can also claim to be more efficient, which brings down the level of 
C*. The possibility of such a gain in efficiency can be clearly seen in equation (7): it can result 
either from a faster execution of the work, i.e. a shorter lead time d, or better controlled costs, i.e. 
a lesser cost c. Strictly speaking, if we simulate the decrease of one of these parameters (or both 
simultaneously), α will increase, in accordance with equation (8). It will evidently be taken into 
account in the following calculations. 
For the orders of magnitude to be chosen, C* is by convention fixed at 100 in each project, since 
this is how the estimates of a and b have been established based on the effective evaluations of 
each project. This cost will therefore be considered as that of the public operator. It corresponds 
to a construction period assumed to last 4 years. These are the values on which the simulations 
will be based. 
The reader will have noticed that the normalization of C* at 100 for all the projects has the 
advantage of giving a simple interpretation of parameters a and b; a is the classical first year rate 
of return (in % since it is rounded to a discounted cost of 100) and b is the gradient of the 
evolution of the profit assumed to be linear (see Figure 1). 
Concerning the IRR targeted by the operator (α0+δ), we recall, as already mentioned in section 2, 
the orders of magnitude of the WACCs depending on whether the operator is public (8%) or 
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private (10%). In the present communication, we will consider the values as given and will not 
make them vary since it would considerably encumber the results. 
Of course, the variations of the project’s IRR (α0) correspond to the ranges of variations chosen. 
For example, Figure 4 shows the variations of a and b for d = 4 and C* = 100. The 17 “actual cases” 
represented by specific values of a and α0 can also be situated in this graph. 
  
Figure 4. Influence of the variables a and b on the projects’ IRR (C*=100 - d=4) 
 
We have distinguished on this graph the projects for which α0 > 8 %. We can see the only project 
in this case on the graph. 
6. A few results on the issue of a swing in favour of either operator 
The aim is then to compare the values of the subsidies in two alternative situations that are either 
that of a public operator (i = 1 in what follows) or of a private operator (i = 2). If the economic 
values that characterize the project lead to equal subsidies S1 and S2, which corresponds to the 
swing point, then the respective parameters of the two situations verify: 
2
22*
222
11*
11
10,010,008,008,0
ba
CS
ba
CS       (11) 
This relation synthesizes the advantage for the public operator that can settle for a WACC of 8% 
whereas the private operator must ensure 10%. Therefore the swing point in favour of one or the 
other operator depends on the values of Ci, ai and bi. 
The swing point value is defined by the situation where the project can be performed 
indifferently by a public operator (situation 1) or a PPP (situation 2). It is therefore necessary for a 
given project 1 (a1, b1, c1, d1 and α1), to find in which conditions a PPP can equalize the need for 
subsidy Si, i.e. to define the range of values of the parameters that ensure the best efficiency of a 
private contractor to build and operate the project. Optimal efficiency can be obtained by 
modifying parameters a, b, c and d, i.e.: 
 By increasing the first year rate of return: a2 > a1 
 By improving the gradient of the annual benefit over time: b2 > b1 
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 By reducing the construction cost: c2 < c1 
 By reducing the project’s lead time: d2 < d1 
It is possible that the private operator is more efficient in all four domains, but at first, we will 
proceed with simulations to evaluate the effort to be made in a single parameter. 
6.1 What performance on the first year rate of return (a)? 
C* stays fixed at 100 and d at 4 years. The calculations are made with equation (11) and the ranges 
of values obtained for a1 and b1 give the values that a2 must reach. The result in figure 5 shows 
that the values of a2 are always higher than those of a1, but also that the difference in performance 
required is as low as the profitability of the project is meagre. This is therefore a new illustration 
of the paradox of financial profitability: projects with low profitability require less effort in terms 
of performance from private actors, making performance more easily achievable. 
  
Figure 5. Gain in efficiency on the first year rate of return a2 
 
The calculation based on actual projects shows that in these cases, the gain in efficiency required 
on this one parameter would be between 40 and 70%. 
As a first analysis, such a result seems unreachable. However one cannot omit the fact that a 
represents a difference (carried over to the discounted cost of the investment) between the 
receipts and the operating costs for the first year after opening. This means that a limited gain on 
the costs can have a significant effect on this difference. 
6.2 What performance on the annual benefit growth rate (b)? 
We are still under the assumptions that C* is fixed at 100 and d at 4 years. The aim is to calculate 
with equation (11) and for the ranges of values of a1 and b1 the values that b2 must reach. The 
result in figure 6 evidently shows values of b2 noticeably higher than b1. 
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Figure 6. Gain in efficiency on the growth of benefits b2 
 
It shows that in almost every case, b should be doubled to reach the swing point under the 
current hypotheses. This strong variation comes partially from the small value of b1. We will note 
that the value required of b2 is higher when a1 is high. Once again, this is a very ambitious gain in 
efficiency. This means that these projects are assumed to attract an increasingly large clientele 
over the long term, which may be a risk difficult for private operators to manage. 
6.3 What performance on the annual investment cost (c)? 
We will assume here that all the parameters are equivalent except the cost c2 for which we 
assume that the private operator is able to save costs compared to c1. In figure 7 below, the 
savings necessary to reach the swing point are shown as relative values. In order to reach the 
equality of public subsidies, it appears that according to the values of a and b, these savings vary 
between 8 and 32%. 
It seems that once again, the challenge is relatively ambitious for the private operator. However, 
if we consider certain major construction projects of the same nature, cases have been observed in 
France in major construction projects for which the public operator has recorded a drift of over 
17%9  for the costs initially anticipated whereas in the case of concession these excesses are rather 
rare. This is why we show on the graph a pertinence domain for the PPPs, which corresponds to 
this order of magnitude but obviously with a question mark. 
                                                        
9 In particular in the case of the Paris-Strasbourg high-speed railway line. 
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Figure 7. Gain in efficiency on the construction costs c2 
 
In this graph, we have also shown by a dotted arrow the trend of the project’s initial IRR. The 
lower the project’s IRR, the lower the effort of efficiency, which confirms the hypothesis that it is 
indeed for the least profitable projects that the PPP can be a good solution. For example, for the 7 
least profitable projects, the efforts to lower the costs remain below 13% whereas they are more 
than double for more profitable projects. 
This result once again confirms the paradox according to which, contrary to what intuition 
suggests, recourse to a PPP has every chance of being more efficient for public finance when the 
financial profitability of the projects is poor.  
It is noteworthy that on top of this effort on c2, it is equally possible to lower the discounted cost 
of the investment C* by faster construction, i.e. by action on d. 
6.4 What performance regarding construction lead time (d)? 
Since all the other parameters are fixed, we seek what would be the necessary reduction of the 
construction lead time (d2). Equations (7) and (11) easily establish the explicit form of d2 and 
simulate the swing point value of this lead time shown in figure 8. The necessary lead time 
reduction is between 7% and 33%, i.e. for a construction project assumed to last 4 years, i.e. a 
reduction of 3 to 15 months. 
To start from a fixed basis, an undertaking such as the Millau viaduct was the object of a 
concession and was built in 3 years and two months, which is only one month less than the 
scheduled lead time. It is true that it was a particularly complex work. For certain more classical 
construction projects, gains of 3 to 6 months on a 4-year project are not unlikely. Private operators 
can probably be more efficient regarding construction lead time than public ones, which are often 
handicapped by administrative and budgetary constraints. 
Note that as for c2, the higher the values of a1 and b1, the greater the reduction of the construction 
lead time must be (and therefore the higher the IRR). Once again we find an additional mark of 
the paradox of financial profitability. 
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Figure 8. Gain in efficiency on construction lead time d2 
 
The simulations show that the efforts of efficiency are considerable and often impossible when 
they are considered separately. The reality never corresponds to this logic of other things being 
equal. It is without a doubt more realistic to consider joint efforts. 
6.5 The hypothesis of joint and equivalent performances on the four parameters 
Even if it is a little naïve to consider that the four parameters can be lowered in the same 
proportions, it is this hypothesis that we have tested, still with the same set of equations. Since 
the joint variations of the parameters can be synthesized in the IRR, in figure 9 the abscissa 
represents this IRR, and the ordinate gives the gain in efficiency that corresponds to the swing 
point values. This gain is given in terms of percentage reduction of the parameters, with the 
percentage assumed to be the same for a2, b2, c2 and d2. 
  
Figure 9. Mean gain in efficiency of the swing point and projects’ IRR 
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We observe that a gain of about 6% on these four parameters ensures the swing in favour of PPPs 
for the least profitable projects whose IRR is lower than 5%. With this order of gain in efficiency 
required, it can be assumed that the challenge could be taken up by a private operator. This 
challenge becomes all the more complicated as the IRR and the parameters a and b increase. We 
can still note that the difficulty of the challenge depends on the relative efficiency of the public 
sector and there can be countries, public bodies or sectors for which poor performances enable 
considering gains in efficiency much higher than 6%. 
7. A confirmation of the paradox of financial profitability 
The previous results, particularly those of the section above, clearly confirm that the effort the 
private operator must expend to offset a higher WACC than that of a public operator is more 
achievable for projects with low profitability.  
In addition, regarding only parameter a, the first year rate of return, which is obviously 
correlated with the financial profitability values of projects, figure 5 shows that for values of a 
close to 2%, the compensation of a WACC higher than that of the public operator will require a 
gain of less than 2 points on the value of a2, but for values close to 6%, a2 must be increased by 
more than 3 points. 
The result is comparable for b, the benefit linear growth rate: when this is close to zero, figure 6 
shows that the compensation requires an increase of b in the region of 1.5, whereas when b is high 
(in the region of 0.3) this parameter must be increased by 3.5. 
The result is very similar regarding the compensation effort on costs. This can be shown by the 
orders of magnitude (which can be seen in figure 7) if we assume that the gain in efficiency only 
concerns the construction costs, that is to say the difference (c1-c2) with the notations of the 
previous paragraph. In the case of a project with an intrinsic IRR of 8%, the private operator must 
be capable of lowering its construction costs by at least 27%, whereas a saving of 10% on the costs 
will suffice in the case of an intrinsic IRR of 2%. 
However, the result is most spectacular regarding the duration of construction d. As shown in 
figure 8, for a first year rate of return higher than 5%, the private operator will be obliged to 
shorten lead time by 25% or more to ensure compensation. But if the immediate profitability is 
lower than 2.5%, the requisite gain in duration is no more than 10 to 12%, which can be 
considered as a relatively commonplace performance for major projects. In France, to comply 
with a European directive at the beginning of the 2000s new highway concessions were entrusted 
to private companies, the winners of calls for tenders, reducing the usual duration of construction 
by more than 20%. 
8. Conclusion 
The main result of this investigation tends to confirm the paradox of financial profitability that 
demands that recourse to PPP is especially interesting for the public finances if the profitability of 
the projects concerned is poor. 
In the case of the French transport system, this result is particularly cogent in view of the 
situation in 2018. The current debates on railway reform are heated and the main argument of the 
opponents of involvement by the private sector, especially the trades unions, is that private 
operators will “skim-off” the most profitable activities. This argument ignores what is shown in 
this paper, which suggests that in the most highly subsidized activities the relative advantage of 
productivity of private operators will be more beneficial for public expenditure. 
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The orders of magnitude obtained on what we have called swing point values constitute the 
other result which is (to our knowledge) original. It suggests that recourse to a PPP requires a 
relatively considerable gain in efficiency by the private operator, at least with the current WACCs 
that we have analysed and for relatively profitable projects. 
To complete this exercise, it would be useful to explore the different values of these WACC that 
could result in significant changes on the long term financial markets, or even risk insurance 
accorded by the public authority for some of the private loans. At the very least, the current and 
future magnitudes of WACCs should be taken into account in order to update our calculations. 
The other investigation that this work very naturally does concerns a precise analysis of cost 
comparison (of construction and operation) between public and private operators. So far we have 
been unable to do more than draw an outline, because of the confidentiality of certain data, and 
especially due to the fact that such data may not exist when the operator is public. This detailed 
knowledge of the difference in efficiency between the public and private sectors would enable to 
better situate, sector by sector, the limits of the pertinence of recourse to PPPs. 
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Appendix A: Estimation of parameters – 17 French motorway projects 
Projects C* (M€) Subsidy (M€) a b IRR 
A48, Ambérieu - Bourgoin-Jallieu 722.6 356.0 3.33 0.20 6.31% 
A89, Balbigny - La Tour-de-Salvigny - 
scenario - 
920.0 694.0 2.23 0.04 3.26% 
A89, Balbigny - La Tour-de-Salvigny - 
scenario + 
920.0 625.0 2.72 0.07 4.19% 
A19, Artenay - Courtenay - Hyp. Basse 607.0 222.0 5.17 0.21 7.67% 
A19, Artenay - Courtenay - Hyp. Haute 607.0 165.0 5.58 0.30 8.64% 
A585, Les Mées - Digne-les-Bains - scénario 1 250.1 139.8 3.44 0.12 5.48% 
A831, Fontenay-le-Comte - Rochefort - 
Interdiction PL 
560.0 243.0 4.60 0.14 6.48% 
A831, Fontenay-le-Comte - Rochefort - Non 
Interdiction PL 
560.0 243.0 4.57 0.14 6.49% 
A41, Saint-Jullien-en-Genevois - Villy-les-
Pelloux - avec tunnel 
692.2 475.0 2.64 0.07 4.15% 
A41, Saint-Jullien-en-Genevois - Villy-les-
Pelloux - sans tunnel 
509.3 277.0 3.84 0.10 5.45% 
A65, Pau - Langon - tracé 1 910.1 548.8 3.00 0.12 5.15% 
A65, Pau - Langon - tracé 2 921.8 683.2 2.11 0.06 3.69% 
A65, Pau - Langon - tracé 3 929.8 647.7 2.45 0.07 4.15% 
A51, Grenoble - Sisteron - par l'est de Gap 1,685.0 1,092.5 2.26 0.10 4.36% 
A51, Grenoble - Sisteron - par Lus-la-Croix-
Haute 
1,436.0 760.0 3.03 0.13 5.30% 
A24, Amiens - Lille - Belgique 800.0 375.0 3.41 0.14 5.76% 
A45, Lyon - Saint Etienne 1,555.0 1,118.0 2.19 0.08 4.02% 
 
